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standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence
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tal evidence indicates the opposite. We identify a lack of robustness
of institutional design with respect to heterogeneity in distributional
preferences as a possible cause and design new experiments that allow
for parsimonious identification of sellers’ distributional types. Our re-
sults indicate that less than a fourth of the subjects behave according
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1 Introduction
A central topic in the field of information economics is the design of insti-
tutions or contracts that mitigate market inefficiencies resulting from the
presence of asymmetric information. Almost all contributions to the litera-
ture build on the assumption of common knowledge that agents are rational
own-money maximizers who behave as desired when kept indifferent in own-
money terms — see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a textbook coverage
of this approach. In this paper we argue that while this assumption is harm-
less in some applications — because it results in institutions that are almost
optimal if preferences are almost as assumed — it is misleading in others.
Specifically, we study markets for credence goods where inefficiencies re-
sult from superior information of sellers about the optimal quality for con-
sumers, and where theory based on the aforementioned standard assumption
predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the problem if customers can verify
the quality received. This prediction is refuted by existing experimental evi-
dence which indicates that markets with verifiability perform no better than
markets without. We identify a lack of robustness of institutional design with
respect to heterogeneity in distributional preferences as a possible cause and
design new experiments that allow for parsimonious identification of sellers’
distributional types based on their provision behavior. The results obtained
in the implementation of the innovative experimental design indicate that
less than a fourth of the subjects behave according to standard theory’s as-
sumption, with the rest behaving either in line with non-standard selfish
or in accordance with non-trivial other-regarding preferences. These results
support our explanation for the failure of verifiability to increase efficiency
and suggest the search for an institutional design that is robust against pref-
erence heterogeneity as an important area for future research. Such research
seems especially important for markets for credence goods where inefficient
institutions potentially cause huge economic costs.1
Credence goods markets are characterized by informational asymmetries
between expert sellers and customers because customers are unable to iden-
1Economically important credence goods markets include the market for medical care
and that for car repair services. For the former the data in the WHO World Health
Statistics (2009) implies that health care expenditures account for approximately 15% of
GDP in the U.S. and are still rising. For the latter the online site researchandmarkets.com
reports annual revenues of about $ 90 billion for the U.S. auto repair industry, of which
70% originate from mechanical repair.
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tify the quality they need, whereas expert sellers are able to do so (Darby
and Karni, 1973). Typical examples are health care services, where the doc-
tor is better informed than the patient on the disease the latter has and on
the treatment he needs; car repair services, where the mechanic knows more
about the type of service the vehicle needs than the owner; and taxicab rides
in an unknown city, where the driver is better informed about the shortest
route to the destination than the tourist. A second informational problem
in markets for credence goods arises when the customer is unable to observe
and verify the quality of service he received. For instance, in the market for
medical treatments a patient might be unable to distinguish a cheap from
an expensive drug infusion; and in the car repair market the owner might be
unable to observe whether a broken part has been repaired or replaced.
The informational asymmetries on credence goods markets may cause a
variety of problems and inefficiencies. Expert sellers may provide unneces-
sarily high quality (a case referred to as ”overtreatment”), or insufficiently
low quality (”undertreatment”), or they may charge for a higher quality than
provided (”overcharging”). Such cases are not only a theoretical possibility,
but are well documented in the literature — for instance, for the market for
medical treatments (see, e.g. Hughes and Yule, 1992, Gruber and Owings,
1996, Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin, 1999, or Iizuka, 2007), for the one for car
repairs (e.g., Wolinsky, 1993, Hubbard, 1998, or Schneider, 2012), and for
that for taxi rides (c.f. Balafoutas et al., 2012).
An important finding in the theoretical literature is that verifiability en-
sures efficiency on markets for credence goods.2 Verifiability applies if con-
sumers are able to observe and verify the quality they receive so that expert
sellers cannot charge for a quality that has not been provided.3 If verifia-
bility applies, experts are predicted to choose equal mark-up prices. Under
the mentioned standard assumption on preferences such prices induce them
to provide the appropriate quality of the credence good. As a consequence,
2See Emons (1997, 2001), Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), Alger and Salanié (2006),
and Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) for research articles on the role of verifiability and
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for a unifying model and a survey of the literature.
3Verifiability is likely to hold in many important credence goods markets. In some cases
— for example pest control, equipment repair and dental services — the customer is present
during provision and can ensure that services charged for have indeed been provided. In
other cases verifiability is secured indirectly through the provision of appropriate evidence.
For instance, in the market for car repairs, it is quite common that broken parts are handed
over to the customer to substantiate the claim (on the bill) that replacement, and not only
repair, has been performed.
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consumers — inferring experts’ incentives from posted prices — are predicted
to interact and maximal efficiency of the market is expected.
We reanalyze experimental data in Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter
(2011) indicating that — contrary to theoretical prediction — verifiability fails
to promote efficiency on credence goods markets. Indeed, the relative fre-
quencies of market interaction, undertreatment and overtreatment do not
differ significantly between two experimental treatments that are identical
except that verifiability applies in one, but not in the other. The observed
aggregate performance in both treatments is better in terms of efficiency than
the standard prediction for a market without verifiability, but considerably
worse than the prediction for a market with verifiability. These findings raise
two questions whose answers are important for the understanding of — and
the optimal design of institutions for — credence goods markets: Why is the
performance of credence goods markets so poor in the presence of verifiability
when all theoretical approaches predict verifiability to ensure efficiency? And
why do markets without verifiability perform so much better than predicted?
In this paper, we argue that heterogeneity in the distributional preferences
of credence goods sellers can explain both, why markets with verifiability per-
form so badly and why markets without verifiability perform substantially
better than predicted. Key to our argument are the following observations:
First, the standard solution to the credence goods problem for the case where
the quality of the goods is verifiable — equal mark-up prices — is robust against
positive deviations from the standard assumption on preferences, but non-
robust against negative ones. Most importantly, it is non-robust against
spiteful experts’ tendency to over- or undertreat customers and against in-
equality averse agents’ incentive to hurt the trading partner in the domain of
disadvantageous inequality. Second, for the prediction for markets without
verifiability the opposite is true — it is robust against negative deviations
from the standard assumption on preferences, but non-robust against posi-
tive deviations. Most importantly, it is non-robust against efficiency loving
experts’ tendency to provide the appropriate quality despite material incen-
tives for undertreatment and against inequality averse agents’ positive atti-
tude towards the trading partner in the domain of advantageous inequality.
Moreover, there is no ’cheap’ repair for the equal mark-up solution to the
credence goods problem in the sense that it does not help to give up just (a
small) part of the surplus to make it robust against (small) deviations from
the standard model of preferences.
To receive empirical support for our explanation for the failure of ver-
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ifiability to secure efficiency on markets for credence goods we design new
experiments intended to identify an expert’s distributional preferences from
his provision behavior. Our main theoretical innovation here is the deriva-
tion of an experimental design that allows to identify a seller’s distributional
archetype without making any structural assumption on sellers’ utility or
motivation function meant to represent preferences. This distinguishes our
approach from most of the rest of the literature on identification of type and
intensity of distributional concerns which uses identification procedures that
rely on strong structural assumptions regarding the form of the utility or mo-
tivational function — such as linearity, piecewise linearity, or specific forms of
convexity, for instance.4,5
We then implement our test for distributional concerns in new credence
goods markets experiments. Our main findings are that (i) only a minority (of
less than a fourth) of subjects behave according to the standard assumption
of lexicographic maximization of first the own and then the other’s material
payoff; (ii) the behavior of a sizeable minority of subjects is consistent with
other forms of selfish preferences; (iii) the behavior of a large majority of
sellers is consistent with either a taste for efficiency (in the spirit of Andreoni
and Miller, 2002, or Charness and Rabin, 2002) or inequality aversion (in the
tradition of Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, or Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000); and (iv)
a minority of subjects behaves spitefully or competitive (à la Levine, 1998,
or Charness and Rabin, 2002). Hence, our empirical findings provide strong
support for heterogeneity in distributional preferences and therewith for our
explanation for the surprisingly low level of efficiency on credence goods
markets in the presence of — and the surprisingly high efficiency level in the
absence of — verifiability.
4For instance, the ring-test — originally developed by social psychologists to assess
"social value orientations" and recently used by economists to identify type and intensity
of distributional concerns (see, for instance, Offerman et al., 1996, Brosig, 2002, or Brandts
et al., 2009) — is based on the assumption of linear preferences; the studies by Iriberri
and Rey-Biel (2010), Cabrales et al. (2010) and Blanco et al. (2011) employ identification
procedures based on the piecewise linear model originally introduced by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) as a description of self-centered inequality aversion and later extended by Charness
and Rabin (2002) to allow for other forms of distributional concerns; and Andreoni and
Miller (2002), Fisman et al. (2007) and Cox and Sadiraj (2012) check consistency with —
and estimate parameters of — standard or modified CES utility functions.
5An exception is Kerschbamer (2011) who develops a test for distributional preferences
that shares many features with the one proposed here. We discuss the relationship further
in Section 3.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first intro-
duces the basic setup of a credence goods market on which our experiments
are based. It then presents predictions based on the mentioned standard
assumption on preferences and the results from two experimental treatments
in Dulleck et al. (2011) which only differ with respect to the presence or ab-
sence of verifiability.6 Section 3 presents our explanation for the low level of
efficiency on credence goods markets in the presence and the high level of effi-
ciency on markets in the absence of verifiability. The explanation is based on
the presence of heterogeneity of distributional preferences, but neither on the
exact fractions of different archetypes of distributional concerns nor on the
exact shape of the preferences of the archetypes. Section 4 contains our main
theoretical innovation — the design of a non-parametric test for distributional
concerns that does not rely on any structural assumptions on preferences and
that is completely nested in a market for credence goods. Section 5 imple-
ments the proposed experimental design and presents the results. Section
6 concludes with a discussion of our results and their implications for in-
stitutional design and for agent selection. Our main message there is that
good performance of credence goods markets requires either robust institu-
tions (combined with arbitrary experts) or ”good” experts (combined with
arbitrary institutions).
2 Verifiability in Credence Goods Markets:
Model, Standard Predictions and Experi-
mental Evidence
This section is subdivided in several subsections. Subsection 2.1 introduces
the simple model of a credence goods market on which our experiments are
based, and Subsection 2.2 the experimental parameterization of the basic
model used in Dulleck et al. (2011) — which will also be used in our new
experiments reported in Section 5. Subsection 2.3 presents predictions on
6Dulleck et al. (2011) have a total of 16 experimental treatments (on the role of liability,
verifiability, competition and reputation) of which we discuss only two here. Dulleck et al.
(2012) use some of the data reported in this paper as a control in their econometric analysis
because the focus is on the question whether a seller’s (endogenous) price-posting behavior
signals her intentions regarding provision and charging behavior. Huck et al. (2007, 2010,
2012) have interesting experiments on the effect of prices and opportunities to build up a
reputation on the performance of markets for experience (rather than credence) goods.
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the role of verifiability based on the mentioned standard assumption on pref-
erences, and Subsection 2.4 uses data from two experimental treatments in
Dulleck et al. (2011) to show that verifiability does not have the predicted
effects and that non-trivial distributional concerns seem to influence the be-
havior of some subjects.
2.1 Basic Model
Consumers are ex ante identical. They need a high quality, q1, of a particular
(credence) good with probability h, and a low quality, q0, with probability
1−h. Each consumer (he) is randomly matched with one seller (she) who sets
prices p1 and p0 for the high, respectively low, quality (with p1 ≥ p0). The
seller has costs c1 (c0, respectively) for the high (low) quality, with c1 > c0.
The consumer only knows the prices for the different qualities, but not
the quality he needs, when he makes his decision whether or not to interact
with the seller. In case of interaction, the seller gets to know which quality
the customer needs. Then she provides one of the two qualities and charges
one of the two prices.
Customers in need of the low quality are sufficiently treated in any case
(both if the seller chooses q0 and if she chooses q1). However, if the customer
needs the high quality, then only q1 is sufficient. A sufficient quality yields
a value v > 0 for the customer, an insufficient quality yields a value of
zero. If the customer decides against interaction then both, the customer
and the seller, receive an outside option of o ≥ 0. In case of an interaction,
the monetary payoff for the consumer is the value from the quality received
minus the price to be paid, whereas the seller receives as a monetary payoff
the price charged minus the costs of the quality provided. More formally, let
θ ∈ {0, 1} be the index of a customer’s need in terms of quality, µ ∈ {0, 1}
the index of the quality provided, and κ ∈ {0, 1} the index of the quality
charged for. Then the material payoff of the seller under price-vector (p0, p1)
is
πs(p
0, p1, µ, κ) = pκ − cµ (1)
while the customer receives
πc(p
0, p1, θ, µ, κ) = v − pκ if θ ≤ µ and − pκ otherwise. (2)
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<INSERT FIGURE 1 about here>
Figure 1 presents this game. Note, that this simple game captures all the idio-
syncratic problems of credence goods markets discussed in the introduction.
If a customer needs q1 and the seller provides q0, we have undertreatment ;
if the customer needs q0 and the seller provides q1, we have overtreatment ;
and if the seller charges p1 when q0 is provided, we have overcharging.
2.2 Experimental Design
In the following we introduce the experimental parameterization of the ba-
sic model used in Dulleck et al. (2011) which will also be used in our new
experiments. We compare two treatments, one without verifiability (treat-
ment N-Endo), and one with verifiability (treatment V-Endo).7 Treatment
N-Endo corresponds to the game shown in Figure 1. Implementing veri-
fiability means that consumers are able to observe and verify ex post the
quality of the provided good (without knowing, however, whether this qual-
ity is the appropriate one). Therefore, in treatment V-Endo the last stage
in Figure 1 is degenerate because the expert has to charge the price for the
provided quality. Hence, with verifiability overcharging (and undercharging)
are precluded, while over- and undertreatment are still possible.
In both treatments the customer’s probability of needing the high quality
is h = 0.5, and the value of a sufficient quality is v = 10. The costs of
providing the low, respectively high, quality are c0 = 2, and c1 = 6. The
prices posted by the sellers, p0 and p1 (with p0 ≤ p1), have to be chosen in
integer numbers from the interval {1, ..., 11}. The outside option if no trade
takes place between the seller and the customer is set to o = 1.6.
Matching groups of eight subjects each were implemented, with four sub-
jects as customers and four subjects as sellers. Role assignment was random
at the beginning and fixed for all 16 periods in the experiment. In order to
prevent attempts to build up a reputation as a reliable seller, there was ran-
dom re-matching of customers and sellers within each matching group after
7The main difference in experimental design between the new experiments and those
in Dulleck et al. (2011) is our reliance on (carefully designed) exogenously given prices for
different qualities of the good rather than letting sellers endogenously decide on prices.
To emphasize this difference we refer to the treatments B/N and B/V in Dulleck et al.
(2011) as treatments N-Endo and V-Endo here, while the new treatments have names
ending in -Exo.
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each period. All experimental sessions were run computerized using zTree
(Fischbacher 2007) and recruiting was done via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). A
total of 184 subjects participated in treatments N-Endo and V-Endo. The
average session length was 1.5 hours, and subjects earned on average 15 Euro.
2.3 Standard Prediction for the Role of Verifiability
Prediction 1 (Standard Prediction for the Role of Verifiability)
Under the assumption that subjects have standard preferences, in treatment
N-Endo no interaction will take place, yielding no efficiency gains in the
market. By contrast, in treatment V-Endo the expert will post p0 = 6 and
p1 = 10 and the consumer will choose to enter the market and he will get the
appropriate quality, yielding full efficiency in the market.
The following considerations lead to this prediction: The standard assump-
tion of common knowledge that all agents are rational, risk-neutral and ex-
clusively interested in their own material payoff implies that in treatment
N-Endo the expert will always charge the higher price p1 and always pro-
vide the cheaper quality q0. Anticipating this a consumer will only accept
if p1 ≤ (1 − h)v − o = 3.4. But with such a p1 even a defrauding seller
earns less than the value of her outside option (because (1− h)v − c0 < 2o).
In treatment V-Endo the expert cannot charge for a quality other than the
provided one, and the provided quality depends on the mark-up pµ − cµ,
µ ∈ {0, 1}: An equal mark-up price-vector is defined as one that satisfies
p1 − c1 = p0 − c0 and under the mentioned standard assumption on prefer-
ences (that if held indifferent in own-money terms the expert will provide in
the best interest of the customer) it is predicted to induce provision of appro-
priate quality. An undertreatment (overtreatment, respectively) price-vector
satisfies p1 − c1 < p0 − c0 (p1 − c1 > p0 − c0, respectively) and is predicted
to induce provision of low (high) quality independently of the customer’s
need. Figure 2 shows in the space of price-vectors the set of equal mark-up
price-vectors (those vectors lie on the green line with slope 1), the set of
undertreatment price-vectors (red area below the equal mark-up line) and
the set of overtreatment vectors (yellow area above the equal mark-up line).
Anticipating how an expert’s provision behavior depends on price-vectors, a
consumer will accept an equal mark-up vector iff p1 ≤ 10, an undertreatment
vector iff p0 ≤ 3, and an overtreatment vector iff p1 ≤ 8. Thus, to maximize
profits, the expert will post the equal mark-up vector (p0, p1) = (6, 10), which
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will be accepted by an own-money-maximizing, risk-neutral consumer.
<INSERT FIGURE 2 about here>
2.4 Experimental Results
Observation 1 (Experimental Results for the Role of Verifiability)
Compared to treatment N-Endo, verifiability has no significant impact on the
frequency of interaction, the undertreatment rate, the overtreatment rate and
overall efficiency. The overall performance in both treatments is better than
the standard prediction for treatment N-Endo, but worse than the one for
treatment V-Endo.
Table 1, Figure 3 and Figure 4 support this observation, leading us to reject
both parts of Prediction 1: Contrary to the prediction efficiency gains and
interaction rates are not significantly different between the two treatments
and they are significantly higher than 0 and significantly lower than 1 in
both.
<INSERT TABLES 1 and 2, as well as FIGURES 3 and 4 about here>
A possible explanation for the relatively high interaction rate and the rel-
atively low undertreatment rate in N-Endo is experts having a taste for
efficiency. Another possible explanation is that experts care for equitable
payoffs. Support for the latter hypothesis comes from the analysis of price-
posting behavior. Contrary to the theoretical prediction equal mark-up prices
are very rare in V-Endo — they are chosen in less than 5% of all transactions.
Table 2 reports the frequencies of the five most popular price-vectors posted
by sellers in the two treatments. It is interesting to note that in treatment
V-Endo only one equal mark-up vector is among the top 5 price-vectors, but
it is not the predicted one. In both treatments the price-vector (6, 8) is by
far the most frequently posted price-vector. If the seller always provided the
appropriate quality and charged for it, then this price-vector would split the
gains from trade equally between the consumer and the seller in each of the
two states (i.e. when the consumer needs the low, and when he needs the
high quality). The prominence of this price-vector therefore suggests that a
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concern for relative payoffs plays a role for aggregate behavior in the exper-
iment. Of course, these observations provide only a rough indication that
distributional preferences may shape sellers’ behavior. In Section 4 we are
going to develop a simple parsimonious test for distributional preferences
within the framework of a credence goods market which is then implemented
in new experiments in Section 5. Before doing so we argue (in Section 3) that
heterogeneity in distributional preferences can explain both, the (relative to
the standard prediction) bad performance of markets with verifiability and
the good performance of markets without verifiability.
3 Heterogeneity in Distributional Preferences
and Robustness of Institutions
Key to our explanation for the relatively bad performance of credence goods
markets with verifiability and the relatively good performance of markets
without verifiability is the observation that the standard solution to the cre-
dence goods problem for the case where the quality of the goods is verifiable —
equal mark-up prices — is robust against the positive impact of distributional
preferences, but non-robust against the negative one. For the prediction for
markets without verifiability the opposite is true — i.e., it is robust against
negative deviations from the standard model of preferences, but not against
positive deviations. It is important to note that our arguments here and
in the next section will not depend on any assumptions on the distribution
of different other-regarding preference-types in the population and on how
exactly the preferences of the subjects look like. Specifically, our discussion
here and in the subsequent section relies on the assumption that (experimen-
tal) credence goods sellers are heterogeneous and that their preferences can
be represented by a utility or motivation function U(πs, πc) satisfying the
following three conditions:
• ∂U/∂πs > 0;
• sign(∂U/∂πc) depends (only) on whether πs ≥ πc, or πs < πc; and
• ∂U/∂πs > ∂U/∂πc.
The first of those conditions is innocuous, it requires only that — holding the
material payoff of the customer constant — the seller’s utility increases in own
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material payoff. This assumption is satisfied by all empirically relevant dis-
tributional preference types discussed in the economic literature. The second
assumption is both permissive and restrictive, depending on the perspective
taken. It is permissive because it allows for all major types of distributional
preferences that have been discussed in the economics literature.8 The second
assumption may be considered as restrictive because it implies (i) that pref-
erences only depend on outcomes, not on the way they are achieved (this is
the defining feature of distributional preferences); and (ii) that the reference
point for the evaluation of allocations (if one is used) is an equal-material-
payoffs allocation.9 The third assumption is fairly innocent for allocations
with πs < πc (it seems sensible to assume that the material payoff of the
customer does not have more weight in the expert’s utility function than her
own material payoff when the customer is already ahead), but might be re-
garded as somewhat restrictive for allocations with πs > πc; its main purpose
is to get a unique ”switching point” in the test proposed below, though, and
it can be relaxed without changing results qualitatively.10 We call an expert:
• SE - selfish iff a) ∂U/∂πc = 0 for πs ≥ πc; & b) ∂U/∂πc = 0 for
8This includes altruism (à la Andreoni and Miller, 2002) and surplus maximization (as
discussed by Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, for instance); inequality aversion (as mod-
elled, e.g., by Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, or Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), difference aversion
(Charness and Rabin, 2002) and egalitarian motives (Dawes et al., 2007; Fehr et al.,
2008); maximin (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), Rawlsian (Charness and Rabin, 2002)
and Leontief preferences (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007); spiteful prefer-
ences (Levine, 1998) and concerns for relative income (Duesenberry, 1949); envy (Bolton,
1991; Kirchsteiger, 1994; Mui, 1995); and equity aversion (Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Fershtman et al., 2012).
9Implication (i) excludes, among others, seller behavior that is influenced by reciprocity
considerations (as modeled by Rabin, 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, and Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006, for instance), or by beliefs on the payoff expectations of the cus-
tomer (as in the guilt aversion models of Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, and Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2007). Implication (ii) is somewhat restrictive (for instance, there might
exist sellers who consider it fair to get 10% more than their customer but unfair to get
20% more), but is still less restrictive than existing models of reference-dependent distri-
butional concerns (as, for instance, those proposed by Bolton, 1991, Mui, 1995, Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, or Charness and Rabin, 2002) which assume
that preferences change qualitatively at equality, while we only allow preferences to change
qualitatively at equality. See Kerschbamer (2011) for a more detailed discussion on this
assumption.
10See Kerschbamer (2011) for details. The test for distributional preferences proposed
there relies on a somewhat milder condition, termed ’m-monotonicity’. Translated to the
present context it requires ∂U/∂πs > 0.
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πs < πc;
• EL - efficiency loving iff a) ∂U/∂πc > 0 for πs ≥ πc;& b) ∂U/∂πc > 0
for πs < πc;
• SP - spiteful iff a) ∂U/∂πc < 0 for πs ≥ πc; & b) ∂U/∂πc < 0 for
πs < πc;
• IA - inequality averse iff a) ∂U/∂πc ≥ 0 for πs ≥ πc; b) ∂U/∂πc ≤ 0
for πs < πc; & c) at least one of the two derivatives is different from 0;
• IL - inequality loving iff a) ∂U/∂πc ≤ 0 for πs ≥ πc; b) ∂U/∂πc ≥ 0
for πs < πc; & c) at least one of the two derivatives is different from 0.
A selfish (SE) seller is a homo oeconomicus according to standard theory; she
simply maximizes her own material payoff. An efficiency loving (EL) expert
is willing to give up own monetary payoff to increase the material payoff of
her trading partner if the ’price of giving’ is not too high. A spiteful (SP)
expert is willing to give up own material payoff to decrease the payoff of her
trading partner if the ’price of taking’ is not too high. An inequality averse
(IA) expert wants to see the payoff of her customer increased if she is better
off than the customer, but she wants to see the customer’s payoff decreased
if the opposite is the case. An inequality loving (IL) expert is willing to
sacrifice own material payoff to increase the difference between the payoffs
of the two trading partners. Figure 5 displays typical indifference curves
for the five archetypes of distributional preferences in the own-payoff/other-
payoff space. It is important to note that our classification does not assume
that the intensity of other-regarding concerns remains constant within a given
domain — as, for instance, the piecewise linear Charness and Rabin (2002)
model does.
<INSERT FIGURE 5 about here>
What can we say about the market behavior of credence goods sellers ex-
hibiting those types of distributional concerns? Consider markets without
verifiability (N-markets) first. For such markets the standard prediction —
undertreatment and overcharging under each price-vector — is already a worst
case scenario that leaves no room for deterioration. To see this, consider a
SP expert, for instance. By always providing the cheaper quality q0 and
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always charging the higher price p1 such an expert maximizes her material
payoff while at the same time minimizing the payoff of the customer. Thus,
she behaves exactly like a SE expert in N-markets. The same is true for
other experts with negative attitudes towards customers — most importantly
for IA experts in the domain of disadvantageous inequality. However, the
positive side of distributional preferences potentially manifests itself in a bet-
ter market outcome than predicted under standard preferences. To see this
consider an EL expert who finds out that the customer needs high quality.
By undertreating the customer instead of providing q1 she increases her ma-
terial payoff by c1 − c0 at a cost of v > c1 − c0 to the customer. Thus, if
the additional profit the seller receives from providing q0 instead of q1 (i.e.,
c1 − c0) is small compared to the loss arising from undertreatment (i.e., v),
and if the weight on πc in her utility function is sufficiently high relative to
the weight on πs, she will refrain from undertreatment. The same is true
for IA experts in the domain of advantageous inequality and for IL experts
in the domain of disadvantageous inequality. In sum, in N-markets experts
with negative distributional concerns behave exactly like experts with stan-
dard preferences while experts with positive distributional concerns tend to
behave better than predicted by standard theory.
For the standard solution for markets with verifiability (V-markets), by
contrast, we get the opposite result. To see this, note that the standard
prediction for equal mark-up prices — appropriate treatment independent
of the level of the mark-up — is already a best-case scenario that leaves
no room for improvement. However, negative deviations from the standard
assumption of preferences easily manifest themselves in the market outcome
because hurting the customer involves no cost under equal mark-up prices. To
see this, consider an EL expert, for instance. Since the material payoff of the
customer enters positively in her utility function, she will act in the interest
of the consumer along the equal mark-up line, where helping the customer
involves no cost. Furthermore, since ∂U/∂πc > 0 in both domains (i.e., in
the domain of advantageous inequality and in the domain of disadvantageous
inequality) the EL expert will provide the appropriate quality even under
price-vectors that deviate (slightly) from the equal mark-up rule. Thus,
EL experts necessarily provide appropriate quality in a corridor along the
equal mark-up line — as sown in Figure 6 — but they do not perform better
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than SE experts at the equal mark-up line.11 The same is true for other
experts with positive attitudes towards customers — most importantly for
IA experts in the domain of advantageous inequality. However, the negative
side of distributional preferences easily manifests itself in a worse market
outcome than predicted under standard preferences. To see this, consider a
SP expert, for instance. Since the material payoff of the customer enters
negatively in her utility function, she necessarily provides high quality to a
consumer who needs low quality and low quality to a consumer who needs
high quality along the equal mark-up line where hurting the customer involves
no cost. Furthermore, since ∂U/∂πc < 0 in both domains the SP expert
will always provide the wrong quality even under price-vectors that deviate
(slightly) from the equal mark-up rule. The same is true for other experts
with negative attitudes towards customers — most importantly for IA experts
in the domain of disadvantageous inequality. Together these observations do
not only explain the poor performance of equal mark-up prices in V-Endo,
they also explain why equal mark-up prices are very rarely chosen in V-Endo.
More importantly, there is no cheap repair for this problem in the sense that
there is simply no price-vector that induces an SP expert, for instance, to
provide the appropriate quality in a V-market. Her provision behavior is
rather (qualitatively) like the one shown in Figure 6 with the important
exception that she will necessarily always provide the wrong (instead of the
appropriate) quality in a corridor along the equal mark-up line.
<INSERT FIGURE 6 about here>
4 Identification of Distributional Preferences
in Markets for Credence Goods
The discussion in the previous section assumes that there is heterogeneity
in distributional preferences in the (experimental) expert population. The
challenge is, of course, to show that empirically. In this section we derive
a parsimonious test for the identification of distributional preferences in the
framework of a credence goods market. The test relies on exactly the same
primitive assumptions on preferences as the discussion in the previous section.
11Point Ω and the other price-vectors indicated by bullet points in Figure 6 are not
important for the arguments in this section — we will refer to them in the next section.
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Our starting point in deriving the test is the observation that in the space
of possible price-vectors there is exactly one (and only one) that allows for
a neat discrimination between the above defined preference types from the
provision behavior in a credence goods market with verifiability. Looking at
Figure 6 it is the price-vector referred to as ’Point Ω’. It is defined as follows:
Definition 1: The price-vector Ω = (p0
Ω
, p1
Ω
) has p0
Ω
= (v+ c1)/2− (c1−c0)
and p1
Ω
= (v + c1)/2.
To discuss the properties of this price-vector we have first to define (and
discuss the location of) the three dashed lines in Figure 6. The upward
sloping dashed line is the equal mark-up line. It connects all price-vectors
with p1 − p0 = c1 − c0 implying that the expert receives exactly the same
material payoff independently of whether she provides q0 or q1 at points
on this line. The horizontal dashed line connects all price-vectors where
the expert and the customer receive exactly the same material payoff if the
expert (correctly or incorrectly) provides q1. Thus, this line is defined by
πs(p
0, p1, µ = 1, κ = 1) = πc(p
0, p1, θ = 1, µ = 1, κ = 1) = πc(p
0, p1, θ =
0, µ = 1, κ = 1) ⇐⇒ p1 = (v + c1)/2. And the vertical dashed line connects
all price-vectors where the expert and the customer receive exactly the same
material payoff if the expert correctly provides q0. Thus, this line is defined by
πs(p
0, p1, µ = 0, κ = 0) = πc(p
0, p1, θ = 0, µ = 0, κ = 0) ⇐⇒ p0 = (v + c0)/2.
Since Point Ω is at the intersection of the upward sloping and the horizontal
dashed it has p0 = (v+c0)/2−(c1−c0)/2 implying that this point is necessarily
to the left of the vertical dashed line — where we have p0 = (v + c0)/2.
Now suppose we (as the experimentalists) impose the price-vector in Point
Ω and look at an expert’s provision behavior. First assume the customer
needs the cheaper quality, q0. If the expert provides the appropriate qual-
ity, she induces a payoff allocation (πs, πc) with disadvantageous inequality.
Why? Because Point Ω is strictly to the left of the vertical dashed line
along which both parties get exactly the same material payoff if the expert
correctly provides q0. If the expert provides the expensive quality instead,
she induces an equal-material-payoff allocation, that is, an allocation with
πs = πc — this follows from the fact that Point Ω is on the horizontal dashed
line. Furthermore, since Point Ω is on the equal mark-up line, the expert’s
own material payoff is the same in both allocations! What does this imply
for provision behavior? An EL expert and an IL expert will necessarily
decide for the asymmetric allocation (by providing the cheaper quality to a
customer who needs the cheaper quality) because the own material payoff
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is the same in both allocations while the customer’s payoff is higher in the
asymmetric than in the symmetric allocation (relevant for EL), or because
disadvantageous inequality is present in the asymmetric but absent in the
symmetric allocation (relevant for IL). By contrast, a SP and an IA expert
necessarily decide for the symmetric allocation (by providing the expensive
quality to a customer who needs the cheaper one) because the own material
payoff is the same in both allocations while the customer’s payoff is lower
in the symmetric than in the asymmetric allocation (relevant for SP), or
because disadvantageous inequality is absent in the symmetric but present
in the asymmetric allocation (relevant for IA).
Now assume that the customer needs the expensive quality, q1. If the ex-
pert provides the appropriate quality q1, then she induces the equal-material-
payoff allocation discussed in the previous paragraph. This follows from the
fact that the material payoff of both parties for providing the expensive qual-
ity is independent of the quality need of the customer. If the expert provides
q0 instead, she induces a payoff allocation (πs, πc) with advantageous inequal-
ity. This follows from the fact that Point Ω has p0 = (v+ c0)/2− (c1− c0)/2
which exceeds c0/2 because v > (c1 − c0). Furthermore, since Point Ω is
on the equal mark-up line, the expert’s own material payoff is the same in
both allocations. Thus, an EL expert and an IA expert will necessarily de-
cide for the symmetric allocation (by providing the expensive quality to a
customer who needs the expensive quality) because the own material pay-
off is the same in both allocations while the customer’s payoff is higher in
the symmetric than in the asymmetric allocation (relevant for EL), or be-
cause advantageous inequality is absent in the symmetric but present in the
asymmetric allocation (relevant for IA). By contrast, a SP and an IL ex-
pert necessarily decide for the asymmetric allocation (by providing the cheap
quality to a customer who needs the expensive one) again because the own
material payoff is the same in both allocations while the customer’s payoff is
lower in the asymmetric than in the symmetric allocation (relevant for SP),
or because advantageous inequality is present in the asymmetric but absent
in the symmetric allocation (relevant for IL).
In sum, if we observe the decision of an expert under the price-vector lo-
cated at Point Ω in Figure 6 twice, once combined with the consumer needing
the low quality and once combined with the consumer needing the high qual-
ity, then we can infer her distributional preference type with some precision.
Specifically, calling the strategy of providing the appropriate quality in both
cases ’appropriate treatment ’, the strategy of providing the expensive quality
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in both cases ’overtreatment ’, the strategy of providing the cheap quality
in both cases ’undertreatment ’, and the strategy of providing the expensive
quality when the cheap quality is needed and the cheap quality when the
expensive one is needed ’always wrong treatment ’ we get the following result:
Proposition 1 (Impartial Distributional Preferences) Consider the
price-vector Ω as defined in Definition 1. Under this price-vector: a) appro-
priate treatment is consistent with SE and EL preferences but inconsistent
with IA, SP and IL; b) overtreatment is consistent with SE and IA prefer-
ences but inconsistent with EL, SP and IL; c) undertreatment is consistent
with SE and IL preferences but inconsistent with IA, SP and EL; d) always
wrong treatment is consistent with SE and SP preferences but inconsistent
with IA, EL and IL.
Proof. Follows immediately from the text preceeding the result.
Testing the provision behavior under the price-vector Ω is like eliciting im-
partial distributional preferences, because under this price-vector a seller
compares two allocations that yield the same material payoff for her, but
different payoffs for the customer. Thus, deciding for the “fair” allocation
(whatever is considered fair) does not involve any costs here. Based on the
predictions for Point Ω we now change p0 slightly, while keeping p1 constant,
in order to test whether (experimental) sellers are willing to give up own
material payoff to help or hurt the customer. Referring back to Figure 6 an
increase in p0 corresponds to a move along the horizontal dashed line to the
right, while a decrease in p0 corresponds to a move to the left. In terms of
payoff allocations, moving to the right (left, respectively) of Point Ω in Fig-
ure 6 means that we increase (decrease) the expert’s payoff for providing q0
at the cost (for the benefit) of the payoff to the consumer, while keeping the
payoffs for both parties for providing q1 constant at the equal-material-payoff
allocation (πs,πc) = ((v− c
1)/2, (v− c1)/2). Given our three assumptions on
the utility or motivational function U(πs, πc), what are the implications of
such a change for the provision behavior of sellers with different types of
distributional preferences? First, we get the following monotonicity result:
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity) Consider two price-vectors, the price-vector Ω
from Definition 1 and a second vector, Ψ,which has the same p1 as Ω (i.e., p1
Ψ
= p1
Ω
) but a different p0 (i.e., p0
Ω
= p0
Ψ
). If p0
Ω
< p0
Ψ
(p0
Ω
> p0
Ψ
, respectively)
then — keeping the consumer’s need with respect to quality constant — an expert
who provides q0 (q1, respectively) under Ω must provide q0 (q1, respectively)
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under Ψ.
Proof. First note that providing q1 yields the equal-material-payoff alloca-
tion πs = πc = (v−c
1)/2 independently of the consumer’s need and indepen-
dently of whether Ω or Ψ is the relevant price-vector. By contrast, the payoff
allocation from providing q0 depends on both, the consumer’s need and the
type of contract. Suppose first the consumer needs q0. Then providing q0
under Ω yields πs = (v−c
1)/2 and πc = (v−c
1)/2+(c1−c0), while providing
q0 under Ψ yields πs = (v − c
1)/2 + ε and πc = (v − c
1)/2 + (c1 − c0) − ε,
where ε > 0 for p0
Ω
< p0
Ψ
and ε < 0 for p0
Ω
> p0
Ψ
. Now suppose the
consumer needs q1. Then providing q0 under Ω yields πs = (v − c
1)/2
and πc = (v − c
1)/2 + (c1 − c0) − v, while providing q0 under Ψ yields
πs = (v − c
1)/2 + ε and πc = (v − c
1)/2 + (c1 − c0)− v − ε, where ε > 0 for
p0
Ω
< p0
Ψ
and ε < 0 for p0
Ω
> p0
Ψ
. It remains to be shown that U(ϕ+ ε, χ− ε)
is increasing in ε. This follows from ∂U/∂πs > ∂U/∂πc for all (ϕ,χ).
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 together imply:
Proposition 2 (Partial Distribution Preferences) Consider the price-
vectors Ω and Ψ from Lemma 1. Then observing a) appropriate treatment
under Ω and Ψ is only consistent with EL preferences (but inconsistent with
SE, IA, SP and IL); b) overtreatment under Ω and overtreatment, appro-
priate treatment or always wrong treatment under Ψ with p0
Ω
< p0
Ψ
is only
consistent with IA preferences (but inconsistent with SE, EL, SP and IL);
c) undertreatment under Ω and undertreatment, appropriate treatment or
always wrong treatment under Ψ with p0
Ω
> p0
Ψ
is only consistent with IL
preferences (but inconsistent with SE, IA, SP and EL); d) always wrong
treatment under Ω and always wrong under Ψ is only consistent with SP
preferences (but inconsistent with SE, IA, EL and IL).
To understand Proposition 2, the test to be applied in the next section (and
the term ’partial’ distribution preferences) consider an IA seller, for instance.
From the arguments above we know that such an expert has to overtreat
a customer under price-vector Ω. Increasing p0 slightly while keeping p1
constant creates a tension between a higher own monetary payoff and more
inequality and vice versa for an IA expert. By deciding for overtreatment or
switching to appropriate treatment (or always wrong treatment) she reveals
a positive willingness to pay for reducing inequality because own-money-
maximization would ask for undertreatment. The argument for sellers with
other kinds of distributional preferences is similar.
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5 Implementing the Test in Lab Experiments
5.1 Experimental Parameters and Procedures
To test for and classify the distributional preferences of sellers, we ran new
experiments using a design based on the results derived in the previous sec-
tion. The timing of the game was exactly the same as in the game described
in Section 2, except for the first stage: Instead of letting sellers post their
prices themselves, the price-vector in a given period was chosen (exogenously
through the software) with equal probability from the set {(3,8), (4,8), (5,8),
(6,8), (7,8)}. This set of vectors has two characteristics: First and foremost,
it includes the equal mark-up vector Ω characterized in Proposition 1 — it is
the vector (4,8). Starting from this price-vector it then varies p0 as described
in Lemma 1 and Proposition 2. The allocations implied by the the equal
mark-up vector Ω and by the other price-vectors in the set are displayed in
Figure 7.12 Second, this set of price-vectors includes the four most frequently
chosen price-vectors in treatment V-Endo (see Table 2). We call the experi-
mental treatment with this (exogenously given) set of price-vectors V-Exo1.
In order to check whether the inclusion of the price-vector (3, 8) — which was
not among the most frequently posted price-vectors in treatment V-Endo —
has any impact on behavior, we also ran an experimental treatment where
the exogenously determined price-vector was chosen with equal probability
only from the four most frequently chosen price-vectors (4,8), (5,8), (6,8),
and (7,8). We call this treatment V-Exo2. We ran four sessions with 16 sub-
jects each both for V-Exo1 and for V-Exo2. Hence, a total of 128 subjects
12Providing the high quality induces the equal-material-payoff allocation (2, 2) indepen-
dent of the needed quality under each price-vector in the set. If the customer needs low
quality, the seller (implicitly) chooses between this allocation (by inefficiently providing
high quality) and the allocation corresponding to the respective price-vector (as indicated
in the figure) on the line (with slope -1) above the equal-material-payoff allocation (by
efficiently providing low quality). If the customer needs high quality, the choice is between
the equal-material-payoff point (by efficiently providing high quality) and the respective
point on the line (with slope -1) below the equal-material-payoff allocation (by inefficiently
providing low quality). Consider the price-vector (4,8), for instance: For the case where
the customer needs low quality the expert’s choice between appropriately providing q0
and inappropriately providing q1 corresponds to a choice between (πs, πc) = (2, 2) and
(πs, πc) = (2, 6), a point located vertically above (2, 2); if the customer needs high quality
instead, then the expert’s choice between appropriately providing q1 and inappropriately
providing q0 corresponds to a choice between (2, 2) and (2,−4), which is located vertically
below (2,−4).
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participated in the new experiments (with no subject having participated in
the experiment reported in Section 2). Sessions lasted less than 1.5 hours
and average earnings were about 15 Euro.
<INSERT FIGURE 7 about here>
5.2 Experimental Results
Since we do not find any significant differences in behavior between V-Exo1
and V-Exo2 we report pooled data from both treatments. In the data analy-
sis we first looked at violations of monotonicity according to Lemma 1. It
turns out that 45 out of 64 sellers (70%) behave in line with the statement
over all 16 periods of the experiment. Taking into account that some learning
may go on in early periods, we decided to focus on the final 12 periods only
(i.e., periods 5 to 16). In those periods the behavior of 56 out of 64 sellers
(88%) respects the monotonicity condition. This high degree of consistent
behavior is encouraging because it suggests that stable (non-standard) pref-
erences, rather than noise or any kind of confusion of subjects, drives our
findings. Of the 56 sellers whose behavior is consistent with Lemma 1, we
had to exclude 3 from further analysis due to lack of data caused by cus-
tomers’ opting out.13 Our data analysis is therefore based on 53 sellers.
Observation 2 (Identification of Distributional Preferences) Less
than a fourth of the experimental sellers act according to standard theory’s
prediction — they provide appropriate treatment if and only if they are held
indifferent in own-money terms. About a fourth of the seller population dis-
plays behavior that is consistent with a strong taste for efficiency — they pro-
vide appropriate treatment even if own-money maximization calls for over-
or undertreatment. About a fifth of sellers shows behavior that is consistent
with strong inequality aversion — they over- or undertreat customers if this
behavior reduces inequality (or turns disadvantageous into advantageous in-
equality) even if it also reduces their own monetary payoff. Adding up strong
13Our criteria for inclusion/exclusion were as follows: We included all experts who had
treated under price vector Ω at least one customer needing q0 AND at least one customer
needing q1. 50 of the 56 sellers were included under this rule. From the remaining 6 sellers,
we included those where the data was consistent with exactly one of the distributional types
introduced in Section 3. Since only 3 sellers were included under this latter rule and since
only 6 seller were at disposition a change in the criteria of inclusion/exclusion would not
have changed our results qualitatively.
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and weak forms of distributional preferences indicates that about half of the
sellers display behavior that is consistent with a taste for efficiency, while lit-
tle more than a fourth of the sellers display behavior consistent with (strong
or weak) inequality aversion.
Table 3 provides a summary of the data. To read it properly, note that sellers
who are classified as either weak EL, weak IA, weak SP, or weak IL types are
also classified as weak SE types. This has to be the case because weak EL,
IA, SP and IL types behave exactly as the strong version of the respective
type as ’impartial spectators’ (that is, when there is no trade off between own
material payoff and a fairness standard), i.e. at price-vector (4, 8) in Figure
7. Once p0 varies, weak EL, IA, SP and IL types act exactly like (strong)
SE types, because their own material payoff is at stake.14 Thus, for relative
frequencies (given in parentheses in Table 3) to add up to 100%, one has to
add up either the strong non-SE types and the total number of SE types or
the total number of non-SE types and the number of strong SE types.
<INSERT TABLE 3 about here>
An important insight is that the behavior of only a minority of individu-
als is consistent with standard theory’s assumption, i.e. that sellers always
follow their monetary incentives and in case of indifference they act in the
interest of customers. Less than a fourth of experimental sellers (those in the
category ”weak EL”) exhibit behavior that is consistent with this assump-
tion. This is an important insight for several reasons. First, it is important
for the current application —institutional design for credence goods markets
under verifiability— because it provides an explanation for both, why equal
mark-up price-vectors do not work as predicted by theory, and why such
vectors were not chosen in the endogenous pricing conditions of Dulleck et
al. (2011). And secondly it is important for institutional design for markets
plagued by asymmetric information more generally, because it suggests that
institutional design based on the standard assumption on preferences might
yield bad incentives for a majority of agents. The results reported in Table
3 also confirm the heterogeneity in distributional preferences on which our
discussion in Section 3 was based — some sellers care for efficiency, some for
14Formally, the reason is that the weak SE type is the limit of all kinds of distributional
types ”when the weight on the distributional part of the utility function approaches zero”.
Note, however, that the limiting behavior is different for the four non-SE types!
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‘equality of payoffs’, some do not care for the well-being of others (or for
efficiency) at all.
Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior is a well established fact, of
course. Indeed, it has been observed in many other games, for instance, in
public goods games (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001, Fischbacher and
Gächter, 2010) and in gift-exchange games (Fehr et al., 1997). Also, in the
literature on identification of type and intensity of distributional concerns,
heterogeneity is well known (see, e.g. Andreoni and Miller, 2002, Charness
and Rabin 2002, Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, or Fisman et al., 2007). Our
main contributions here are (i) that our identification procedure depends only
on a small set of primitive assumptions on preferences, which is in contrast
to much of the previous literatures; and (ii) that our test for distributional
preferences is completely nested in a market for credence goods which might
help to alleviate the concern that the results of elicitation procedures based
on dictator games are not robust and not easy to extend to other important
economic situations. Since our results are qualitatively in line with those
reported by the path-breaking dictator game studies by Andreoni and Miller
(2002), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel (2004) and Fis-
man et al. (2007) that reservation against such studies seems exaggerated,
however.
6 Conclusions
This paper has argued that heterogeneity in distributional preferences pro-
vides an explanation for both, why credence goods markets with verifiability
fail to reach efficient outcomes and why markets without verifiability perform
considerably better than predicted by standard theory. Key to our argument
is the observation that the standard prediction for markets without verifia-
bility is non-robust against the presence of agents with positive distributional
concerns, while the standard solution to the credence goods problem for the
case where the quality of the goods is verifiable — equal mark-up prices — is
non-robust against the presence of agents with negative distributional con-
cerns.
To receive support for our explanation we have designed a parsimonious
experiment that allows for clean discrimination between different preference
types from their provision behavior. One important feature of our experi-
mental design is that the discrimination does not depend on any structural
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assumptions on the utility or motivational function meant to represent pref-
erences. The experimental design rather directly tests the key characteristics
of different variants of distributional preferences that have been discussed
in the economic literature. A second important design feature is that our
test for distributional concerns is completely nested in a market for credence
goods.
While the design of a clean test for distributional concerns within a cre-
dence goods context is the key theoretical innovation of the present paper,
important conclusions for credence goods-markets and, more generally, for
markets with asymmetric information can be drawn from our experimental
results. Specifically we found in the implementation of our experimental de-
sign that less than a fourth of the experimental sellers behave according to
standard theory’s assumption (that all agents are rational own-money max-
imizers who behave as desired if held indifferent in own-money terms), the
rest behaving either in line with non-standard selfish or in accordance with
non-trivial other-regarding preferences. An immediate implication is that
institutional design based on the standard assumption of lexicographically
maximizing agents yields bad incentives for a majority of agents. Another
implication of our experimental results is that there are agents that behave
appropriately independently of the institutional design. Taken together these
two observations have two immediate consequences, one for institutional de-
sign, the other for agent selection.
Designing the Right Institutions: What is needed for a well-performing
market is not a perfect institution for one type of agent, but rather an insti-
tution that is robust against the coexistence of different types of agents. Our
results clearly show that verifiability is not such an institution (nor is a mar-
ket where verifiability does not apply). By contrast, as Dulleck et al. (2011)
have shown, ’liability’ is a quite robust institution in markets for credence
goods. ’Liability’ requires verifiability of ’outcomes’, while ’verifiability’ re-
quires only verifiability of ’inputs’. Thus, securing verifiability of outcomes,
where possible, might solve credence goods problems more effectively.
Selecting the Right Agents: Designing robust institutions might be dif-
ficult, especially for markets for credence goods. Imposing liability, for in-
stance, generates other problems or may be impossible to achieve.15 As a
15On the one hand, liability requires a form of verifiability of the outcome. Especially
in the medical realm treatment success is often impossible or very costly to measure for a
court, while still being observed by the consumer (how can one prove the presence/absence
of pain, for instance?). On the other hand, even in cases where the outcome is verifiable
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consequence, selecting the ”right” agents for jobs involving experts’ services
becomes particularly important. Instead of choosing doctors, mechanics or
computer specialists exclusively according to their training, customers or
their representatives should worry more about the attitudes of these experts
towards their customers. Selecting the right agents may also help to solve
problems created by uncertainty over input costs: With cost uncertainty
standard theory would predict that verifiability cannot solve the problems
on credence goods markets — a problem ignored in the formal literature on
credence goods thus far. Our results suggest that verifiability can solve this
problem if the ”right” agents are selected: Efficiency loving experts provide
appropriate treatment in a corridor along the equal mark-up line; that is,
even if monetary incentives are not perfectly in line. Hence, the crucial task
of potential employers or buyers is to identify experts with the right dis-
tributional —or more generally speaking, social— preferences. Public policy
might step in here, for instance, by screening candidates for crucial studies
(as medicine, for instance) not only after their performance in entry exams
but also in accordance with their social track record. Since the ’effort cost’
for performing social activities is arguably lower for more ’consumer-friendly’
types, a CV featuring an impressive track record of volunteer work might well
act as a screening device.
(for instance, in the repair business) strict liability might pose problems. For instance, an
insufficiently repaired car may work for some time before it breaks down. To mitigate the
undertreatment problem in such a situation the liability needs to cover a longer period. But
during this longer period the car may stop working for reasons unrelated to the expert’s
behavior. Also, an extended liability period may induce fraudulent behavior on the side
of the customer as she may not put in the required maintenance effort — a problem that
has previously been discussed by Taylor (1995).
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7 Tables and Figures
.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for N-Endo and V-Endo
Averages per Period N-Endoa V-Endoa
Interaction 0.45 0.50
Efficiencyb 0.18 0.16
Undertreatmentc 0.53 0.60
Overtreatmentd 0.06 0.05
Overcharginge 0.88 -
Profit Seller 2.69 2.58
Profit Customer 1.00 1.06
a none of the variables is significantly different between the two treatments
(using two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests with matching groups of
8 subjects as independent observations).
b calculated as (actual average profit — outside option) divided by
(maximal possible average profit — outside option)
c customer needs q1, but seller provides q0
d customer needs q0, but seller provides q1
e seller provides q0, but charges p1 (with p1 > p0 and customer needs q0)
.
Table 2: Most Popular Price-Vectors in N-Endo and V-Endo
Treatment N-Endo Treatment V-Endo
(pl, ph) absolute # rel. frequency (pl, ph) absolute # rel. frequency
(6,8) 176 22.92% (6,8) 265 37.64%
(4,8) 84 10.94% (7,8) 89 12.64%
(5,7) 50 6.51% (5,8) 46 6.53%
(5,8) 44 5.73% (4,8) 17 2.41%
(4,7) 39 5.08% (8,8) 15 2.13%
393 (of 768) 51.17% 432 (of 704) 61.36%
30
Table 3: Classification of Individual Behavior in V-Exo
distributional type strong weak total
EL (efficiency loving) 14 (26.4%) 12 (22.6%) 26 (49.0%)
IA (inequality averse) 10 (18.9%) 4 (7.5%) 14 (26.4%)
SP (spiteful) 0 (0%) 3 (5.7%) 3 (5.7%)
IL (inequality loving) 0 (0%) 2 (3.8%) 2 (3.8%)
SE (selfish) 8 (15.1%) 21 (39.6%) 29 (54.7%)
31
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Figure 1: The Credence Goods Game 
 
 
Figure 2: Standard Prediction for Provision Behavior under Verifiability 
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Figure 3: Relative Frequency of Interaction in N-Endo and V-Endo  
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Figure 4: Relative Frequency of Undertreatment in N-Endo and V-Endo  
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Figure 5: Indifference Curves of SE, IA, EL, SP and IL Experts in (πs, πc) Space 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Provision Behavior of an EL Expert under Verifiability 
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Figure 7: Possible Combinations of Buyer’s and Seller’s Material Payoffs  
(for different price-vectors and depending on whether the buyer needs q0 or q1) 
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Experimental Instructions for the –Exo Treatments 
(not intended for publication) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please do not to talk to any other participant 
until the experiment is over. 
 
2 Roles and 16 Rounds 
This experiment consists of 16 rounds, each of which consists of the same sequence of decisions. This 
sequence of decisions is explained in detail below. 
There are 2 kinds of roles in this experiment: player A and player B. At the beginning of the 
experiment you will be randomly assigned to one of these two roles. On the first screen of the 
experiment you will see which role you are assigned to. Your role remains the same throughout the 
experiment. 
A player A interacts with a player B. This pair of players changes for each round. Therefore you are 
interacting in every round with a new player (of the other role). 
 
All participants get the same information on the rules of the game, including the costs and payoffs for 
both players. 
 
Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round 
Each round consists of a maximum of 2 decisions which are made consecutively. Decision 1 is made 
by player B and decision 2 is made by player A. In each round 2 prices will be announced before 
players make their decisions. These prices are set for a given round. This price setting is referred to in 
the following as “Decision 0”.  
 
Short Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round 
0. The prices for action I and action II are announced to both players. 
1. Player B decides whether he/she wants to interact with player A. If he/she chooses No, the 
round ends. 
If player B chooses to interact then 
2. Player A (but not player B) is informed about the type of player B. There are two possible 
types of player B: he/she is of either type I or type II. Player A has to choose an action: either 
action I or action II. He/she then receives the price for the chosen action valid for this round. 
This price has to be paid by player B. 
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Detailed Illustration of the Decisions and Their Consequences Regarding Payoffs 
 
Decision 0 
In case of an interaction player A has to choose between two actions, action I and action II, in 
Decision 2.  Each chosen action causes costs which are as follows: 
Action I results in a cost of 2 points (=currency of the experiment) for player A.  
Action II results in a cost of 6 points for player A.  
Player A receives from player B the valid price for the action he/she chooses in Decision 2 if player B 
decides to interact with him/her. At Decision 0 the valid prices for action I and action II for this 
round are announced to both players.  
 
Decision 1 
Player B decides whether he/she wants to interact with player A.  
If he/she wants to do so, then player A chooses an action in Decision 2 and he/she receives the valid 
price for this action from player B.  
If he/she doesn’t want to interact, then this round ends and both players get a payoff of 1.6 points 
for this round. 
 
Decision 2 
Before Decision 2 is made (in case player B chose “Yes” at Decision 1) a type is randomly assigned to 
player B. Player B can be of one of two types: type I or type II. This type is determined new in each 
round. With a probability of 50% player B is of type I, and with a probability of 50% he/she is of 
type II. Imagine that a coin is tossed in each round. If, for example, the result is “heads”, player A is 
of type I, if it is “tails” he/she is of type II.  
Player A gets to know the type of player B before he/she makes Decision 2. Then player A chooses 
an action, either action I or action II, and receives the corresponding price (valid for the respective 
round). 
 
An action is sufficient under the following conditions: 
a) In case player B is a type I player and player A chooses either action I or action II. 
b) In case player B is a type II player and player A chooses action II. 
An action is not sufficient if player B is of type II and player A chooses action I. 
 
Player B receives 10 points, if the action chosen by player A is sufficient. Player B receives 0 points 
if the action chosen by player A is not sufficient. In both cases player B has to pay the valid price for 
the chosen action. 
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At no time player B will be informed about whether he/she is of type I or a type II in any given 
round. 
 
Payoffs 
If player B chooses not to interact in Decision 1 (decision “No” of player B) then both players receive 
1.6 points for this round.  
Otherwise (decision “Yes” by player B) the payoffs are as follows: 
 
Player A receives the price (denoted in points, as announced in Decision 0) for the action chosen in 
Decision 2, less the cost of this action.  
 
Player B’s payoff depends on whether the Decision 2 of player A was sufficient or not. 
a) If the action was sufficient, player B gets 10 points less the price for the action chosen by 
player A in Decision 2. 
b) If the action was not sufficient, player B has to pay the price for the action chosen by player A 
in Decision 2.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 6 points. With this 
endowment you are able to cover losses that might occur in some rounds. Losses can also be 
compensated by gains in other rounds. If your total payoff sums up to a loss at the end of the 
experiment you will have to pay this amount to the supervisor of the experiment. By participating in 
this experiment you agree to this term. Please note that there is always a possibility to avoid losses in 
this experiment. 
 
To calculate the final payoff the initial endowment and the profits of all rounds are added up. This sum 
is then converted into cash using the following exchange rate: 
 
1 point = 25 Euro-cents 
(i.e. 4 points = 1 Euro) 
 
 
